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Abstract
We introduce a description of the power structure which is inherent in a
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sheaf generalizes the notion of effectivity functions which has been widely used
in implementation theory, taking into consideration that changes in outcome
may be sustained not only by single coalitions but possibly by several coalitions,
depending on the underlying strategy choices. Also, it allows us to consider
game forms with not necessarily finite sets of outcomes, generalizing the results
on solvability of game forms obtained in the finite case in Abdou and Keiding
(2003).
Keywords: Nash equilibrium, strong equilibrium, solvability, effectivity, acyclic-
ity.
JEL Classification: C70, D71
AMS Classification: 91A44
∗University Paris 1, CNRS, Paris School of Economics.Centre d’Economie de Paris, 106-112
Boulevard de l’Hoˆpital 75647 Paris Cedex 13; email: abdou@univ-paris1.fr
†University of Copenhagen, Department of Economics, Studiestraede 6 DK-1455 Copen-
hagen K, Denmark; e-mail: Hans.Keiding@econ.ku.dk
1
1 Introduction
A game form is strongly solvable if for each assignment of individual preferences
over outcomes, the resulting game possesses a strong Nash equilibrium. Several
necessary conditions for strong solvability can be found in the literature; Abdou
and Keiding (2003) provide conditions which are both necesssary and sufficient,
at least for the case where the strategy sets of the game form are all finite. In
this paper, we extend the results obtained for finite games to the more general
case where strategy sets and outcome spaces are compact Hausdorff spaces. The
need for such an extension is rather obvious, since the use of mixed strategies
will turn a finite game into a game with infinitely many strategies. To perform
this extension, we present a model of interaction based on power distribution
among agents, a model general enough to allow for a representation of classical
coalitional models (e.g. effectivity functions) as well as to capture the essential
features of strategic models (e.g. game forms). For this, we use an extension of
the well-known concept of an effectivity function associated with a game form
introduced by Moulin and Peleg (1982) and the property of acyclicity of this
extended effectivity function, also known from the implementation literature, cf.
e.g. Abdou and Keiding (1991). This extension is done in such a way that the
essential interaction inherent in a strategic game form can be represented in the
new object. An interaction sheaf is to the notion of equilibrium (e.g. Nash or
strong Nash) precisely what the effectivity function is to the core.
A game form is said to beM-solvable (whereM is any collection of coalitions)
if it has M-equilibria for any assignment of preferences. Nash solvability and
strong Nash solvability are special cases of M-solvability. In the present case of
infinite strategy spaces, the notion of an outcome-dependent effectivity function,
which is at the basis of the characterization of solvability, is naturally formalized
using the concept of a sheaf, which captures the idea of local (outcome-dependent)
power of coalitions by specifying the power structure valid at each open set of
outcomes. It turns out that the right concept in this setting is the interaction sheaf
associated with a game form. Furthermore the notion of an abstract interaction
sheaf is introduced and the corresponding notion of settlement set and stability.
An interaction sheaf is an object which is similar to that of an effectivity
structure as introduced by Abdou and Keiding (2003), with the difference that it
can be used in the context of outcome spaces that are not necessarily finite. The
advantages of the present way of formalizing power structures are that (1) it allows
for the representation of various equilibrium concepts within the same interaction
form, whereas the effectivity structure is specific to one equilibrium concept, (2)
in the current model, it allows for operations like projections that faithfully reflect
the change in the underlying coalition structure, and, most importantly, (3) since
only the interactive form associated to some game form and some equilibrium
concept is relevant for stability, it allows for a simple comparison between different
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procedures or mechanisms with respect to stability. An interaction form can thus
be viewed as an intrinsic representation of power without a direct reference to
strategies or to some equilibrium concept.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we give the definitions of the
basic concepts such as game forms, preferences, equilibria, and in Section 3, we
proceed to the concepts which are central for the following, namely interaction
sheaves. In this section, we also investigate some general properties of interaction
sheaves, and we introduce the notion of a settlement as well as stability of inter-
action sheaves. The next section is concerned with the characterization of stable
interaction sheaves by the property of acyclicity, thus extending a result known
from simple games (Nakamura (1979)) and effectivity functions (Keiding (1985))
to the present general context of interaction sheaves. Section 5 contains the main
result of the paper, showing that solvability of game forms may be characterized
in terms of stability or acyclicity of the associated interaction sheaf, and Section
6 gives a brief treatment of the special case where the set of alternatives is con-
vex, and where there are also convexity conditions on individual preferences. The
concluding section contains some final comments.
2 Basic definitions and notations
In the present section, we introduce the concepts and the notation which will be
needed as we proceed. We use the following notational conventions: For any set
D, we denote by P(D) the set of all subsets of D and by P0(D) = P(D)\{∅}
the set of all nonempty subsets of D. Elements of P(N) are called coalitions; an
active coalition structure (shorthand ACS) is a subset M of P0(N).
A game form is an array G = (X1, · · · , Xn, A, g). Here the set N = {1, · · · , n},
where n ≥ 2, is interpreted as the set of players, Xi is the strategy set of player
i, for i ∈ N , A is the set of alternatives, and g :
∏
i∈N Xi −→ A is the outcome
function. For every coalition S ∈ P0(N), the product
∏
i∈S Xi is denoted XS
(by convention X∅ is the singleton {∅}) and N\S is denoted S
c. Similarly if
B ∈ P(A), A\B is denoted Bc. If xN ∈ XN , the notation g(xS, XSc) stands for
{g(xS, ySc) | ySc ∈ XSc} if S 6= ∅ and for g(XN) if S = ∅.
For any set D, Q(D) denotes the set of all quasi-orders on D (that is all binary
relations on D which are complete and transitive). We let
◦
R denote the strict
preference relation associated with R, that is a
◦
R b if and only if a R b and not
b R a.
We assume that X1, . . . , Xn and A are Hausdorff compact topological spaces
and that g is continuous and onto. We denote by G the set of open sets of A, by
F that of closed sets. Moreover G0 ≡ G \ {∅} and F0 ≡ F \ {∅}. A quasi-order R
on A is continuous if for any a ∈ A the sets {b ∈ A | b R a} and {b ∈ A | a R b}
are closed. A continuous real function u induces a continuous quasi-order R by
3
setting a R b if and only if u(a) ≥ u(b).
A game in strategic form is an array (X1, . . . , Xn;Q1, . . . , Qn), where for each
i ∈ N , Xi is the set of strategies of player i, and Qi is a quasi-order on XN =∏
i∈N Xi. For M an ACS (active coalition structure), a strategy array xN ∈ XN
is an M-equilibrium of the game (X1, . . . , Xn;Q1, . . . , Qn) if there is no coalition
S ∈M and yS ∈ XS such that for all i ∈ S:
(yS, xSc)
◦
Qi xN .
For R ∈ Q(A) we put P (a,R) = {b ∈ A | b
◦
R a }. A preference profile (over
A) is a map RN from N to Q(A), also written as RN = (R1, . . . , Rn), so that a
preference profile is an element of Q(A)N . For notational convention, we write
P (a, i, RN) for P (a,Ri), and we use the notations P (a, S,RN) = ∩i∈SP (a, i, RN)
for S ∈ P0(N). For each preference profile RN ∈ Q(A), the game form G induces
a game (X1, . . . , Xn;Q1, . . . , Qn) with the same strategy spaces as in G and with
the Qi defined by
xN Qi yN ⇔ g(xN)Ri g(yN)
for xN , yN ∈ XN . We denote this game by (G,RN)
We say that a ∈ A is an M-equilibrium outcome of (G,RN) if there exists
an M-equilibrium xN in (G,RN) such that g(xN) = a. Let L ⊂ Q(A) be a
subset of preferences. The game form G is said to be solvable in M-equilibrium
or M-solvable on L if for each preference profile RN ∈ L
N , the game (G,RN)
has an M-equilibrium. In particular, when M = N = {{1}, . . . , {n}}, the set
of all singleton coalitions, then an M-equilibrium is simply a Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, when M = P0(N), the family of all coalitions, an M-equilibrium is a
strong Nash equilibrium.
3 Interaction sheaves
In this paper, we aim at a characterization of M-solvable game forms using a
suitable notion of power structure which is inherent in the game form. This
approach was initiated by the seminal paper by Moulin and Peleg (1984), where
they introduced the effectivity function associated with a game form. For the
solvability of game forms, the effectivity function contains too little information,
and refined notions of power structures were considered by Abdou and Keiding
(2003) in the context of solvability of game forms with finite strategy spaces.
Below we introduce a generalization of effectivity functions that will work in the
context of solvability of game forms with an infinite number of strategies.
The basic extension of the concept of an effectivity function needed in order
to treat solvability problems consists in changing the focus from coalitions taking
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joint action, which is the scenario considered in simple games or effectivity func-
tions, to collections of coalitions acting independently but simultaneously. The
formalization has to take this into account, and this leads to the concept of an
interaction array to be defined below as an instance of simultanous coalitional
action. In the interpretation, where one associates this extended concept to a
game form, these collections of coalitions acting simultaneously arise in a natural
way: an outcome can be overruled if no matter by which strategy array it was
achieved there is one of the coalitions in the collection which can force outcome
to be something else.
Definition 3.1 (a) An interaction array on (N,A) is a map ϕ : P0(N)→ P(A)
with ϕ(S) 6= ∅ for some S ∈ P0(N). Let P0(N,A) be the set of all interaction
arrays. We introduce a partial order ≤ on P0(N,A) by the formula ϕ ≤ ψ if and
only if ϕ(S) ⊂ ψ(S) for all S ∈ P0(N). For A ⊂ P(A). We denote by A0(N,A)
the set of all interaction arrays with values in A.
(b) An interaction form with values in A is a map E : G0 → P(A0(N,A)) such
that for all U ∈ G0, ϕ, ψ ∈ A0(N,A), if ϕ ∈ E [U ] and ϕ ≤ ψ, then ψ ∈ E [U ].
(d) The interaction form E is a an interaction presheaf if U ⊂ V ⇒ E [V ] ⊂ E [U ]
for all U, V ∈ G0, and an interaction sheaf if, in addition, for each U ∈ G0 and
each open covering (Ui)i∈I of U one has E [U ] = ∩i∈IE [Ui].
Interaction forms are collections of interaction arrays that satisfy natural con-
ditions of non-trivialness and monotonicity, and they can be considered as a
formalization of the power structure in society. Part (c) of the definition con-
nects the power structure of the interaction form to the topology of the outcome
space.
The notion of an interaction presheaf extends that of an effectivity function
in two distinct ways. Apart from the shift of focus from coalitions to collections
of coalitions, which was mentioned above, the interaction presheaf incorporates a
local approach to coalitional power, in the sense that a collection of coalitions may
be effective for upsetting some choices by society but not other choices. This local
aspect which makes it natural to use the notion of a sheaf in the formalization of
this power structure.
By a slight abuse of language, we say that an interaction presheaf E is closed-
valued (open-valued) if for all U ∈ G0, each ϕ ∈ E [U ] belongs to F0(N,A)
(G0(N,A)), so that not the set E [U ] but all the intersection arrays in this set
have closed (open) values.
When E is a presheaf, we may think of an interaction array in E [U ] as a
description of an available move of the agents given any state in U . In order
that a scenario leading to some outcome be viable, it needs to be approved by
all coalitions. To interpret the statement ϕ ∈ E [U ], one may imagine that any
outcome in U can occur in different scenarios that are not directly explicited in
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the model; any scenario leading to some state in U may arouse some coalition
S ∈ M that objects by threatening to drive the outcome into ϕ(S), and in this
case a is rejected. Implicitly, a may arise in many different scenarios. In order
to disrupt a the simultaneous move of all coalitions may be needed; these moves
are interpreted as being disjunctive and simultaneous. When a coalition structure
becomes active at a, this activation must be understood as a collusion of interests
between its components. Indeed the rejection of a is equivalent to the rejection of
each scenario leading to a, and each scenario may be opposed by some coalition
in M. Our model is universal in the sense that we allow a priori all coalitions
to react to some state in U . Nevertheless, the fact that ϕ(S) = ∅ for some S
means that coalition S is inhibited or desactivated and therefore that the power
represented by ϕ holds without the participation of S. Therefore the support of ϕ
(i.e. those coalitions S for which ϕ(S) is nonempty) is in fact the active coalition
structure behind ϕ.
Remark 3.2 The discussion of the present section has been confined to situ-
ations where the coalition structure is P0(N), the set of all nonempty subsets
of N . However, restricting to any M ⊂ P0(N) means simply that we consider
only interaction arrays which are projections ϕ|M to M of interaction arrays
ϕ ∈ P0(N,A), where
ϕ|M(S) =
{
ϕ(S) if S ∈M,
∅ otherwise.
E|M[U ] = {ϕ ∈ A0(N,A) | ϕ|M(S) ∈ E [U ]} (1)
It turns out (see Proposition 5.2 and Remark 5.1) that this restriction reflects
faithfully what is meant when the coalitions that are allowed to act jointly are
the members of the ACS M.
As a first example of an interaction form, we consider the one induced by an
effectivity function E, that is a map E : P0(N) → P(P0(A)). To define the
interaction form EE associated with E we let EE[U ], for U ∈ G0, contain all the
interaction arrays ϕ such that δ(S,B) ≤ ϕ, for B ∈ E(S), where
δ(S,B)(S
′) =
{
B if S ′ = S,
∅ otherwise.
This is an interaction sheaf, which is constant in the sense that EE[U ] does not
depend on U . Similarly, given an interaction form E one can extract an effectivity
functions EE with
EE(S) = {B ∈ P0(A) | δ(S,B) ∈ E [A]}.
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For a more interesting interaction form, consider a game form G = (X1, . . . , Xn,
A, g) andM⊂ P0(N). The β-interaction form associated with (G,M) is defined
as
EG,Mβ [U ] = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | ∀xN ∈ g
−1(U),
∃S ∈M,∃yS ∈ XS : g(yS, xSc) ∈ ϕ(S)} (2)
for all U ∈ G0. Thus, the β-interaction presheaf associated with G contains
at the open set U all the interaction forms ϕ which are such that any strategy
array with outcome in U can be modified by at least one coalition S so as to
have its outcome in ϕ(S). This is actually an interaction sheaf. As is usual,
the β-construction shows what coalitions can do by adapting their coordinated
strategy choices to the situation, the latter represented by a strategy array with
outcome in U . There is a corresponding α-construction: Define the α-interaction
form associated with G and M by
EG,Mα [U ] = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | ∃xN ∈ g
−1(U),
∀S ∈M,∀yS ∈ XS : g(yS, xSc) ∈ ϕ(S)}. (3)
The α-interaction form is in general not a sheaf nor even a presheaf. It assigns
to any open set the interaction arrays which specify for each coalition S a set
of outcomes, namely ϕ(S) that Sc can force, given some fixed strategy array. In
Section 5 we study interaction forms associated with continuous game forms.
Example 3.3 Let G be a game form belonging to an n-person unanimity game
with infinite strategy spaces: Each player has strategy space X, where X is a
compact topological space, at the outcome space is X ∪ {∗}, where ∗ a distin-
guished point not belonging to X; the outcome function pi : (X∪{∗})n → X∪{∗}
is given by
pi(x1, . . . , xn) =
{
x if x1 = x2 = · · · = xn = x,
∗ otherwise.
We want to find EGβ [U ] for some open set U , beginning with the case where
U ⊂ X. Some of the interaction arrays in EGβ [U ] are easily identified: If ϕ(N) 6= ∅,
then ϕ ∈ EGβ [U ], since the grand coalition can obtain any outcome in X ∪ {∗}.
Next, every coalition with more than one member can obtain ∗ by having its
members choosing different strategies, and similarly every collection of coalitions
can obtain ∗ responding on any strategy array with outcome in U by choosing
different strategies. The corresponding interaction arrays are all ϕ satisfying
∗ ∈ ϕ(S) for some coalition S.
Finally, in the game form G, strategies giving outcomes in U , that is strategies
which are all equal to some x ∈ U , may be left unchanged by coalitions, meaning
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that by doing nothing they obtain that outcome belongs to U , The interaction
forms corresponding to this option are all ϕ with U ⊂ ϕ(S) for some S.
Summing up, we have
EGβ [U ] = {ϕ | ϕ(N) 6= ∅} ∪ {ϕ | ∗ ∈ R(ϕ)} ∪ {ϕ | U ⊂ R(ϕ)},
where we have used the notation R(ϕ) = {x ∈ A | ∃S : x ∈ ϕ(S)}.
If U is the set {∗}, which is open in X ∪ {∗}, then finding all intersection
arrays is somewhat more complicated, so we restrict to the case where M =
{N}∪{N\{i} | i ∈ N}. We have as before that EG,Mβ [U ] contains {ϕ | ϕ(N) 6= ∅}
and {ϕ | ∗ ∈ R(ϕ)}. To obtain something different from ∗, a coalition should
be able to equalize all strategy choices. Coalitions N\{i} for i ∈ N can always
do this, and interaction arrays ϕ such that ϕ(N\{i}) = A\{a} for each i ∈ N ,
with R(ϕ) = A\{a}, will belong to EG,Mβ [{∗}]. However, it is easily seen that
EG,Mβ [{∗}] contains no interaction arrays φ for which R(ϕ) is strictly smaller than
A\a for some a ∈ A.
Whether coalitions in the ACS have a real interest to dismantle an outcome
a, depends on the actual preferences. This is why we introduce the following:
Definition 3.4 Let E be an interaction presheaf, and let RN ∈ Q(A)
N be a
preference profile. The alternative a ∈ A is dominated in E at RN if there is an
open neighbourhood U of a and an interaction array ϕ ∈ E [U ] such that for all
S ∈ P0(N), ϕ(S) ⊂ P (a, S,RN).
A settlement (for E at RN) is an alternative which is not dominated at RN ;
the set of all settlements is denoted Stl(E , RN). For L, a set of preferences, the
interaction presheaf E is stable on L if Stl(E , RN) is nonempty for all profiles
RN ∈ L
N .
The definition of domination given here corresponds to the usual one, given that
the fundamental instrument of domination, which in the context of simple games
or effectivity functions was a coalition and an alternative or a subset of alterna-
tives, has been replaced by the interaction array as expressing the collection of
coalition-subset pairs that may block a particular outcome. The set of undomi-
nated alternatives, which corresponds to the standard notion of the core, is called
the settlement set to prevent possible confusion.
An outcome a is a settlement if there exists at least one scenario that forces
a and is such that no active coalition has an incentive to disrupt it. Thus, the
notion of a settlement generalizes the well-known concept of the core; since the
notion of domination is more general, going beyond what is achieved by a single
coalition working separately, we have chosen to use another term for the set of
undominated alternatives.
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In the next section, we shall consider combinatorial conditions on the interac-
tion presheaf E which implies that it is stable. In the remainder of this section,
we shall have a closer look at the topological properties of E .
First of all we notice that there is a quasi-order ⊂ defined on interaction
presheaves by
E ⊂ E ′ if and only if E [U ] ⊂ E ′[U ] for all U ∈ G0.
Since the intersection of any family of interaction presheaves (sheaves) over A
is an interaction presheaf (sheaf), and since the trivial sheaf defined by E ′[U =
A0(N,A) for all U ∈ G0 contains all presheaves, it follows that for any interaction
presheaf E , there is a minimal (for ⊂) interaction sheaf (called the sheaf cover of
E and denoted E+) containing E , whereby for any U ∈ G, E+[U ] is defined as the
intersection of all E ′[U ] with E ′ ⊃ E , and E ′ is a sheaf.
Proposition 3.5 Let E be an interaction presheaf with values in A, and for each
open set U , let R(U) be the set of all open coverings of U . Then
E+[U ] =
⋃
R∈R(U)
⋂
V ∈R
E [V ] (4)
and Stl(E , RN) = Stl(E
+, RN) for any profile RN .
Proof: Let E ′[U ] denote the expression on the right hand of (4), then it is
staightforward that E ′ is a sheaf. Moreover for U open, E [U ] ⊂ E ′[U ] trivially,
since U is itself a covering of U , so E+[U ] ⊂ E ′[U ]. It follows that E+ ⊂ E ′.
Conversely if E ′′ is a sheaf such that E” ⊃ E , then it is easy to see that E ′′ ⊃ E ′.
It follows that E+ ⊃ E ′. The second statement follows from the definition of
domination.
Our definition of an interaction form, designed so as to capture the phenomenon
of state-dependent power structure, has taken as primitive notion of local power
the interaction arrays corresponding to the open neighbourhoods of the topology,
corresponding to the classical notion of a presheaf (cf. eg. Bredon, 1990). Al-
ternatively, we might have considered local power as defined for each point of A
(corresponding to studying the sections of a presheaf). Below, we consider such
an alternative approach. In the terminology of sheaf theory, this corresponds to
looking at the stalks of the sheaf at each point, which in some cases may be more
appropriate.
Definition 3.6 An interaction bundle with values in A is a map I : A →
A0(N,A). The alternative a ∈ A is dominated in I at the profile RN ∈ Q(A)
N if
there exists ϕ ∈ I[a] such that for all S ∈ P0(N): ϕ(S) ⊂ P (a, S,RN). The set
Stl(I, RN) of settlements for I at RN consists of all the alternatives which are
not dominated in I at RN .
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It turns out that the β-interaction bundle associated with a game form is related
in a straightforward manner to the question of existence of equilibria of that game
form (Proposition 5.2). On the other hand the relation between acyclicity and
stability is easier to express using interaction presheaves (Theorem 4.4) We now
explore the interrelations between the two objects. To every interaction presheaf
E we associate the interaction bundle E• defined by
E•[a] =
⋃
U∈U(a)
E [U ],
where U(a) is the set of all open neighbourhoods of a. The following proposition
is obvious.
Proposition 3.7 Let E be an interaction presheaf. Then for any preference pro-
file RN ∈ Q(A)
N , Stl(E , RN) = Stl(E
•, RN).
Conversely, to any interaction bundle I we may associate an interaction sheaf I⋄
defined by
I⋄[U ] =
⋂
a∈U
I[a]
for any U ∈ G. The question whether any sheaf can be obtained in this way is
answered in the following:
Proposition 3.8 For any interaction presheaf E one has E ⊂ E•⋄ and E+ = E•⋄.
Moreover E is a sheaf if and only if E = E•⋄. It follows that any sheaf E can be
obtained as I⋄ where I is the interaction bundle E•.
Proof: The interaction form E•⋄ = (E•)⋄ is a sheaf by its construction, and
clearly E ⊂ E•⋄, so that E+ ⊂ E•⋄. Let U ∈ G0, let E
′ ⊃ E be a sheaf, and for
any a ∈ A let U(a) be the set of all open neighbourhoods of a. Writing out the
definitions and using inclusion, we have that
E•⋄[U ] =
⋂
a∈U
⋃
V ∈U(a)
E [V ] ⊂
⋂
a∈U
⋃
V ∈U(a)
E ′[V ].
Now we have (set theoretic equality):⋂
a∈U
⋃
V ∈U(a)
E ′[V ] =
⋃
(Vb)∈Πb∈UU(b)
⋂
b∈U
E ′[Vb],
where the union is over all possible collections V = (Vb)b∈U , with Vb ∈ U(b) for
all b ∈ U . Since E ′ is a sheaf, we have that ∩b∈UE
′[Vb] = E
′[∪b∈UVb] ⊂ E
′[U ]. It
follows that E•⋄[U ] ⊂ E ′[U ]. Since E•⋄ ⊂ E ′ for all E ′ ⊃ E , we have E•⋄ ⊂ E+.
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Proposition 3.9 (i) For any interaction presheaf E, E• = (E+)•.
(ii) For presheaves E and F , E• = F• if and only if E+ = F+.
Proof: (i) Let a ∈ A. Since E ⊂ E+ one has E•(a) ⊂ (E+)•(a). Let ϕ ∈ (E+)•(a).
then for some open neigborhood U of a, ϕ ∈ E+(U) and by Proposition 3.8, there
exists some open covering (Ui)i∈I of U such that ϕ ∈ E(Ui) for all i ∈ I. Since
there exists i0 ∈ I such that a ∈ Ui0 we have that ϕ ∈ E
•[a].
(ii) It follows from (i) that the equality E+ = F+ implies E• = F•. Conversely
if E• = F•, then by Proposition 3.8, E+ = E•⋄ = F•⋄ = F+.
We remark that an interaction bundle I may be not equal to I⋄•, that is for some
a ∈ A, it may be the case that I(a) 6= ∪U∈U(a)I
⋄[U ].
Example 3.10 Let f : A → A be any map and for any a ∈ A, let U(a) be the
set open neighborhoods of a. Then the map If : A→ P0(A) defined by
If [a] = {f(U) | U ∈ U(a)}
can be viewed as an interaction bundle, since subsets of A can be identified with
elements of P0({1}, A). We have that
If [a] = ∪U∈U(a)
(
If
)⋄
[U ]
if and only if f is continuous at a.
This justifies the following:
Definition 3.11 An interaction bundle I is said to be regular if I = I⋄•.
If I is regular, then for any preference profile RN ∈ Q(A)
N , Stl(I, RN) =
Stl(I⋄, RN); this is a consequence of Proposition 3.7.
Proposition 3.12 Let I be an interaction bundle. In order that I be regular it
is necessary and sufficient that I = E• for some presheaf E; moreover in this case
there exists a unique sheaf E such that I = E•, namely E = I⋄.
Proof. The result follows immediately from Propositions 3.8 and 3.9.
One can summarrize the situation as follows: The operation • takes an interac-
tion presheaf to some regular interaction bundle, and its restriction to the set of
sheaves is injective, its inverse being the operation ⋄.
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4 Stability of interaction presheaves
In this section, we introduce a combinatorial property of interaction presheaves
which is shown to be equivalent to stability. This extends the results of Abdou
and Keiding (2003) to the topological setup, given that the interaction presheaf
satisfies a mild continuity assumption and preferences are representable by con-
tinuous real functions.
The notion of a cycle is basic in considerations of stability, that is nonempti-
ness of the core (of effectivity functions) or the settlement set (of interaction
presheaves) for all assignments of preferences. It generalizes the ideas introduced
by Nakamura (1979) in the context of simple games: If every alternative is dom-
inated for some assignment of preferences to individuals, then there must be a
configuration of dominating entities (coalition-subset pairs or interaction arrays,
depending on the situation) which are mutually compatible in the sense that they
can occur for a particular assignment of preferences. This latter condition con-
stitutes the key part of the definition of a cycle; it can be restated in a way as
to indicate, that for each individual the participation in the different instances of
domination should be consistent with some quasi-order on the set of alternatives.
To define a cycle, we need some notation: For ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) and i ∈ N the
i-range of ϕ is the set
Ri(ϕ) =
⋃
S:i∈S
ϕ(S).
Definition 4.1 Let E be an interaction presheaf. A cycle in E is a family
(Uk, ϕk)rk=1, where U
k ∈ G, ϕk ∈ E [Uk], k = 1, . . . , r with the properties:
(i) ∪rk=1U
k = A,
(ii) if i ∈ N and ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r} then there exists k ∈ J such that
Uk ∩Ri(ϕj) = ∅ for all j ∈ J .
If E has no cycles, then E is said to be acyclic.
We shall also need an alternative formulation of the condition defining a cycle.
Lemma 4.2 Let E be an interaction presheaf. Let Z := (Uk, ϕk)rk=1, be a family
where Uk ∈ G, ϕk ∈ E [Uk], k = 1, . . . , r and ∪rk=1U
k = A, Then the following are
equivalent:
(1) Z is a cycle of E ,
(2) For each i ∈ N there is a permutation (k1, . . . , kr) of (1, . . . , r) such that
for any j ∈ {1, . . . , r},[
Uk1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ukj
]
∩
[
Ri(ϕkj) ∪ · · · ∪Ri(ϕkr)
]
= ∅.
Proof: (1)⇒(2): Let (Uk, ϕk)rk=1 be a cycle in E . We check that the family
(Uk, ϕk)rk=1 satisfies (2). Indeed, let i ∈ N be arbitrary. By property (ii) in
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Definition 4.1 applied to J = {1, . . . , r}, we get the existence of k1 ∈ {1, . . . , r}
such that Uk1 and ∪rk=1R
i(ϕk) have empty intersection. Now, let 2 ≤ j ≤ r and
assume that indices k1, . . . , kj−1 have been constructed such that[
Uk1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ukj−1
]
∩
[
∪k∈{1,...,r}\{k1,...,kj−2}R
i(ϕk)
]
= ∅;
applying now property (ii) of Definition 4.1 with J = {1, . . . , r}\{k1, . . . , kj−1}
we get kj ∈ J such that[
Uk1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ukj
]
∩
[
∪k∈{1,...,r}\{k1,...,kj−1}R
i(ϕk)
]
= ∅;
Repeating the procedure r times yields a permutation (k1, . . . , kr) with the desired
properties.
(2)⇒(1): We check that (Uk, ϕk) is a cycle in E , and it suffices to show that (ii)
of Definition 4.1 is fulfilled. Thus, let i ∈ N and let J be a nonempty subset
of {1, . . . , r}. Let j0 be such that J ⊆ {kj0 , . . . , kr} where (k1, . . . , kr) is the
permutation defined in (ii). Then each set Ri(ϕj) ∩ Ukj0 for j ≥ j0, so that Ukj0
does not intersect any of the sets Ri(ϕj), for j ∈ J , and we have shown that (ii)
of Definition 4.1 is satisfied.
For proving equivalence of stability and acyclicity, we need the following lemma
which is a slight extension of a classical topological result about normal spaces.
Here and in the sequel, W denotes the closure of the set W .
Lemma 4.3 Let (Ui)i=1,...,p be a finite collection of open sets in a normal topo-
logical space E. Then there are open sets Wi (i = 1, . . . , n) with the following
properties:
(i) W i ⊂ Ui for i = 1, . . . , p,
(ii) ∪i∈JUi = E ⇒ ∪i∈JWi = E for all subsets J of {1, . . . , p}.
Proof: Let J ⊂ P({1, . . . , p}) be the set of of subsets of indices such that
∪i∈JUi = E. For any h ∈ {1, . . . , p} let Jh = {J ∈ J | h ∈ J}. Without loss of
generality we assume that Jh 6= ∅ for all h. Then the sets U
c
h and ∩j∈J,j 6=hU
c
j are
disjoint for each J ∈ Jh, so that
U ch ∩
[
∪J∈Jh ∩j∈J,j 6=h U
c
j
]
= ∅.
By normality of E, there are disjoint open sets V and Wh such that U
c
h ⊂ V and[
∪J∈Jh ∩j∈J,j 6=h U
c
j
]
⊂ Wh. Clearly W h ⊂ V
c ⊂ Uh, and for each J ∈ Jh, Wh
contains ∪j∈J,j 6=hU
c
j , so that (Wh, (Uj)j∈J,j 6=h) is a covering of E. Replacing the
family (U1, . . . , Up) by (Wh, (Uj)j 6=h) and repeating the procedure taking succes-
sively h = 1, 2, · · · , p, we eventually get a family (W1, . . . ,Wp) with the desired
properties.
13
A family (Wi)
p
i=1 with the properties stated in Lemma 4.3 is called a refinement
of (Ui)
p
i=1.
Now we are ready for the main result of this section. As explained in the
beginning of the section, the technique of proof consists basically in showing that
the cycle conditions posed on each individual are exactly those that allow for the
construction of a particular assignment of preferences to individuals such that all
alternatives become dominated.
Theorem 4.4 An interaction presheaf E : G0 → P(F0(N,A)) is stable if and
only if it is acyclic.
Proof. Assume that E is not stable. Then Stl(E , u) is empty for some continuous
profile u = (u1, . . . , un), that is for any a ∈ A there is U
a ∈ G and ϕa ∈ E [Ua]
such that such that ϕa(S) ⊆ P (a, S, ui) for all S ∈ P0(N), or expressed otherwise,
ui(a) < min{ui(b) | b ∈ R
i(ϕa)} for all i ∈ N such that Ri(ϕa) 6= ∅. Since
the ui are continuous, there exists an open neighbourhood W
a of a such that
sup{ui(c) | c ∈ W
a} < min{ui(b) | b ∈ R
i(ϕa)} for all i ∈ N such that Ri(ϕa) 6= ∅.
Moreover, by the presheaf property, ϕa ∈ E [Ua ∩W a].
Since A is compact, there exist a1, . . . , ar such that the family (U
a1∩W a1 , . . . ,
Uar ∩W ar) is a covering of A. Put V k = Uak ∩W ak , ϕk = ϕak , k = 1, . . . , r. We
show that (V k, ϕk)rk=1 is a cycle.
Clearly, ∪rk=1V
k = A; to check (ii) in Definition 4.1, let i ∈ N and ∅ 6= J ⊂
{1, . . . , r}. Let k ∈ J such that sup{ui(c) | c ∈ V
k} = minj∈J sup{ui(c) | c ∈ V
j}.
We claim that V k ∩ Ri(ϕj) = ∅ for all j ∈ J . Indeed, this is trivially true if
Ri(ϕj) = ∅. If Ri(ϕj) 6= ∅, let a ∈ V k and b ∈ Ri(ϕj). We then have
ui(a) ≤ sup
c∈V k
ui(c) ≤ sup
c∈V j
ui(c) < ui(b),
which proves the claim and shows that (V k, ϕk)rk=1 is indeed a cycle.
Conversely let (Uk, ϕk)rk=1 be a cycle in E . We construct a profile (u1, . . . , un)
such that Stl(E , u) is empty. By Lemma 4.2 there is a permutation (k1, . . . , kr)
of (1, . . . , r) such that for any j ∈ {1, . . . , r},[
Uk1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ukj
]
∩
[
Ri(ϕkj) ∪ · · · ∪Ri(ϕkr)
]
= ∅,
and by Lemma 4.3 there is a refinement (W k)rk=1 of (U
k)rk=1 such that[
W
k1
∪ · · · ∪W
kj
]
∩
[
Ri(ϕkj) ∪ · · · ∪Ri(ϕkr)
]
= ∅
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , r}. We construct for each i ∈ N a continuous function ui on
A such that
ui(c) ≤ h− 1 for h ∈ {1, . . . , r} and c ∈ W
kh
,
ui(b) ≥ h for b ∈ R
i(ϕkh).
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This may be done as follows: Since A is a normal topological space, there is for
each h ∈ {1, . . . , r} a continuous function vh : A→ [0, 1] such that
vh(a) =
{
0 if a ∈ W
k1
∪ · · · ∪W
kh
1 if a ∈ Ri(ϕkh) ∪ · · · ∪Ri(ϕkr).
The function ui =
∑r
h=1 v
h has the desired properties.
Consider now the profile (u1, . . . , un). If a ∈ W
j
and i ∈ N , then there exists
an index h (depending on i) such that kh = j. It follows that ui(a) ≤ h and
for any b ∈ Ri(ϕj), ui(b) ≥ h + 1, therefore R
i(ϕj) ⊂ P (a, ui) for each i, and
by the presheaf property we have P (W k, ·, u) ∈ E [W k], so that every a ∈ W k
is dominated. Since (W1, . . . ,Wn) is a covering of A, the set of undominated
alternatives at the profile (u1, . . . , un) is empty.
Remark 4.5 Theorem 4.4 has been proved for the class of continuous preferences
representable by continuous functions. It is easy to see, by a slight modification
of the first part of the proof, that the same result holds for the larger class of
continuous preferences.
The characterization of stable interaction presheaves given in Theorem 4.4 gives
a purely combinatorial property of the power structure, which in principle may
be verified without recourse to preference profiles and notions of domination.
In order to exploit this fact in characterizing solvable game forms, we need to
investigate the relation between equilibria of the game form and the settlements
of its associated interaction forms and bundles. This is done in the following
section.
5 Game form solvability and stability of inter-
action forms
In this section, we connect the notion of stability and its characterization in
the previous section to that of solvability of game forms, the link being the β-
interaction presheaf of the game form. Let G = (X1, · · · , Xn, A, g) be a game
form such that the strategy spaces Xi for i = 1, . . . , n as well as the outcome
space A are compact Hausdorff spaces, and where g is continuous and onto. In
Section 3, we introduced the associated β-interaction presheaf EGβ . We assume
that an ACSM⊂ P0(N) is given. We define the associated β-interaction bundle
Iβ ≡ I
G,M
β by
Iβ[a] = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | ∀xN ∈ g
−1(a),
∃S ∈M, yS ∈ XS : g(yS, xSc) ∈ ϕ(S)} (5)
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and the corresponding interaction sheaf (2). Similarly we define the α-interaction
bundle Iα ≡ I
G,M
α and the corresponding interaction form Eα ≡ E
G,M
α given by
(3). One has ϕ ∈ Eβ[U ] if and only if ϕ
c /∈ Eα[U ], where by definition ϕ
c(S) =
ϕ(S)c for all S ∈ P0(N). It is also clear that Eβ = (Iβ)
⋄.
Remark 5.1 One advantage of our present model compared to that of Abdou
and Keiding (2003) is that restrictions on active coalition structures as given in
(1) reflect faithfully the shift of power from one ACS to another in the game form
G. This is because we have:
EG,Mβ = (E
G,P0(M)
β )|M
where the object on the right-hand side is the projection of EG,P0(M)β on M. It
follows that one needs only to know EG,P0(M)β in order to deduce E
G,M
β for all
active coalition structures M.
The following result is straightforward but central for our characterization of
solvable game forms. It shows that the concept of β-interaction bundle is to
the M-equilibrium of the game (G,RN) what the β-effectivity function is to the
β-core of the latter game:
Proposition 5.2 For any RN the set of M-equilibrium outcomes of (G,RN) is
equal to Stl(Iβ, RN).
Proof: Let a ∈ A be an M-equilibrium outcome of (G,RN). There exists an
M-equilibrium xN ∈ X of (G,RN) such that g(xN) = a and for all S ∈ M
and yS ∈ XS, g(yS, xSc) /∈ P (a, S,RN), and consequently, the interaction array
P (a, ·, RN) does not belong to Iβ[a]. If follows that a is not dominated in Iβ[a]
at RN , or equivalently a ∈ Stl(Eβ, RN).
Conversely, if a ∈ Stl(Iβ, RN), then the interaction array P (a, ·, RN) is not in
Iβ[a]. But then there must be some strategy array xN ∈ X with g(xN) = a such
that g(yS, xSc) /∈ P (a, S,RN) for all S ∈M and all yS ∈ XS, showing that xN is
an M-equilibrium.
With the result of Proposition 5.2 we are getting close to our goal, since we have
identified the settlement set of I˚β at RN with the set ofM-equilibria of (G,RN).
What remains is to relate I˚β to the β-effectivity sheaf, a somewhat technical task
which is performed in the remainder of this section.
In order to apply the main result of Section 4, we need to work with interaction
presheafs or interaction bundles which are either closed- or open-valued. Since
however the relevant presheaf has a particular structure, we need a closer look at
the β-interaction presheaf as well as other, related, constructions. We recall that
the set of closed (open) valued interaction arrays is denoted F0(N,A) (G0(N,A)).
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We define the presheaves Eβ (E˚β), Eα (E˚α) by restricting for each U ∈ G0 to
the interaction arrays which take only closed (open) sets as values. Similarly, we
introduce the interaction bundles Iβ, I˚β, Iα (I˚α).
Proposition 5.3 For any continuous RN , the set of M-equilibrium outcomes of
(G,RN) is equal to Stl(I˚β, RN).
We shall make use of a topology on the set of interaction arrays: For any ψ ∈
P0(N,A), define the lower interval Iψ and the upper interval Jψ by :
Iψ = {ϕ ∈ F0(N,A) | ϕ ≤ ψ}
Jψ = {ϕ ∈ G0(N,A) | ψ ≤ ϕ}
The collection {Iψ | ψ ∈ G0(N,A)} is a basis for a topology on P0(N,A) which
is called the upper topology. F0(N,A) will be endowed with its topology as a
subspace of P0(N,A).
Lemma 5.4 For any a ∈ A and any U ∈ G0 we have:
(i) Iα(a) = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | Iϕ ∩ Iα(a) 6= ∅}
(ii) Eα[U ] = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | Iϕ ∩ Eα[U ] 6= ∅}
(iii) Iβ(a) = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | Jϕ ⊂ I˚β(a)},
(iv) Eβ[U ] = {ϕ ∈ P0(N,A) | Jϕ ⊂ E˚β[U ]}
Proof: If Iϕ ∩ Iα(a) 6= ∅ then clearly ϕ ∈ Iα(a). Conversely, assume that
ϕ ∈ Iα(a), then there exists xN ∈ XN such that g(xN) = a and for all S ∈ M,
g(xSc , XS) ⊂ ϕ(S). Since the sets g(xSc , XS) for S ∈ P0(N) are closed, the
interaction array ψ defined by ψ(S) := g(xSc , XS), (S ∈ P0(N)) belongs to Iα(a)
and ψ ≤ ϕ. This proves assertion (i).The verification of the other assertions is
left to the reader.
Lemma 5.5 The correspondence Iα from A to F0(N,A) has closed graph in
A×F0(N,A).
Proof: Let (a, ϕ) ∈ A× F0(N,A), let Va be the set of open neighbourhoods of
a, let Vϕ be the family Vϕ := (V : V ∈ G0(N,A), ϕ ≤ V ) and let V = Va × Vϕ.
Assume that (a, ϕ) belongs to the closure of the graph of Iα, that is for any
V ≡ (V1, V2) ∈ V there exist b
V ∈ V1 and ψ
V ∈ IV2 ∩ Iα(b
V ). By the definition of
Iα, there exists x
V
N ∈ XN such that g(x
V
N) = b
V and for all S ∈M , g(xVSc , XS) ⊂
ψV (S) ⊂ V2(S).
The set V ordered by componentwise inclusion is a directed set. Since X is
compact, the net (xVN)V ∈V admits a convergent subnet, say (x
Vt
N )t∈T , where (T,≥)
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is a directed set. Let xN be its limit; by continuity of g, g(xN) = a. We claim
that for all S ∈ M, g(xSc , XS) ⊂ ϕ(S). Indeed, for any t ∈ T , continuity of g
implies that g(xSc , XS) ⊂ V2,t(S). Let V ∈ Vϕ. Since A is normal and due to the
subnet property, there exists some t ∈ T such that ϕ(S) ⊂ V2,t(S) ⊂ V2(S) for
all S ∈ S. Therefore g(xSc , XS) ⊂ V2(S). Since the last inclusion is true for all
V2 ∈ Vϕ, again by normality it follows that g(xSc , XS) ⊂ ϕ(S). We conclude that
ϕ ∈ Iα(a).
Lemma 5.6 I˚β is regular:
(
E˚β
)•
= I˚β.
Proof: Let a ∈ A. For any open neighbourhood U of a,
(
E˚
)
β
[U ] ⊂
(
I˚
)
β
(a),
so that
(
E˚β
)•
⊂ I˚β. Conversely, if ϕ ∈
(
I˚
)
β
(a) then ϕc /∈ Iα(a), where ϕ
c is
the interaction array defined by ϕc(S) = ϕ(S)c, all S. It follows from Lemma
5.5 that there exist U ∈ G0, W ∈ G0(N,A) such that a ∈ U , ϕ
c ∈ IW and for
all b ∈ U , Iα(b) ∩ IW = ∅; in view of Lemma 5.4(i), W /∈ I˚α(b) or equivalently
W c ∈ Iβ(b). Since W
c(S) ⊂ ϕ(S) for all S ∈ P0(N), we have ϕ ∈ I˚β(b). Since
this is true for any b ∈ U , we get that ϕ ∈
(
I˚β
)⋄
(U) ≡ E˚β[U ], and since a ∈ U we
have ϕ ∈
(
I˚
)⋄
β
[U ].
Example 5.7 Let A := X1 × X2, let pi : X1 × X2 → X1 × X2 be the identical
map on A, and let pii for i = 1, 2 be the projections. Let M = {{1}}. For any
(x1, x2) ∈ A, U ∈ G0, let
Iβ(x1, x2) = {B ⊂ A | x2 ∈ pi2(B)},
Eβ[U ] = {B ⊂ A | pi2(U) ⊂ pi2(B)},
then we have:
Iβ(x1, x2) = {ϕ | ϕ(1) ∈ Iβ(x1, x2)},
Eβ(U) = {ϕ | ϕ(1) ∈ Eβ[U ]}.
We remark that the set {(y1, x2)} ∈ Iβ(x1, x2), but unless x2 is isolated, there
is no U ∈ U(x1,x2)) such that pi2(U) = {x2}. Therefore, unless X2 is finite, we
must have that E•β 6= Iβ. It follows that unless X2 is finite, Iβ and Iβ are not
regular. Moreover, if R : X2 → X1 is a map, then the graph of R, Graph(R), is
an element of Eβ[A], but unless R is continuous, there is no closed B ∈ Eβ[A]
such that B ⊂ Graph(R). It follows that there is no analog of Lemma 5.4(i) for
Iβ.
Lemma 5.8 For any a ∈ A and any U ∈ G0 we have:
(i) I˚β(a) = {V ∈ G0(N,A) | IV ∩ Iβ(a) 6= ∅}.
(ii) E˚β[U ] = {V ∈ G0(N,A) | IV ∩ Eβ[U ] 6= ∅},
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Proof: By the definitions, if V ∈ G0(N,A) and IV ∩Iβ(a) 6= ∅, then V ∈ E˚β(a).
Conversely, if V ∈ I˚β(a), then V
c /∈ Iα(a), so that by Lemma 5.5 there exists
W ∈ G0(N,A) such that V
c ∈ IW and IW ∩ Iα(a) = ∅. In view of Lemma
5.4(i), W /∈ I˚α(a), or equivalently W
c ∈ Iβ(a). Since W
c ∈ IV , we have W
c ∈
IW ∩ Iβ(a). This proves (i). The proof of the other assertion is left to the
reader.
Lemma 5.9 For each continuous profile RN we have:
Stl(Iβ, RN) = Stl(I˚β, RN) = Stl(E˚β, RN) = Stl(Iβ, RN) = Stl(Eβ, RN)
and this set equals the set of equilibrium outcomes of G at RN .
Proof: Let RN be a continuous profile. Put V (S) = P (a, S,RN) (S ∈ P0(N)).
Clearly V has open values. The first equality follows by Proposition 5.3. The
second equality follows from regularity of I˚β (Lemma 5.6). In view of Lemma
5.8(i), Stl(I˚β, RN) = Stl(Iβ, RN). From Lemma 5.8(ii), we get that Stl(E˚β, RN) =
Stl(Eβ, RN).
Now we have all the ingredients for the main result of this section, and indeed
of the paper, which provides a combinatorial necessary and sufficient condition
for solvability of a game form.
Theorem 5.10 G is M-solvable if and only if Eβ (E˚β) is acyclic.
Proof. Applying Theorem 4.4 to Eβ, one has that M-solvability of G is equiv-
alent to acyclicity of the interaction sheaf Eβ. Moreover, by Lemma 5.8(ii) any
cycle of E˚β gives rise to a cycle of Eβ.
Conversely, given a cycle (Ck, ϕk)rk=1 of Eβ, applying Lemma 4.3 one may
replace the open covering (Ck)rk=1 of A by an open covering (U
k)rk=1 such that
U
k
⊂ Ck for k = 1, . . . , r. The array (U
k
, ϕk)rk=1 still verifies the combinato-
rial properties of cycles. By a further application of Lemma 4.3 to the family(
(U
k
)c, (ϕk(S))c, k = 1, · · · , r, S ∈ P0(N)
)
of open sets, one can replace (U
k
, ϕk)
by (W k, ψk), taking open values such that U
k
⊂ W k and ϕk(S) ⊂ ψk(S) for
all S ∈ P0(N), k = 1 · · · , r, thus getting a family (U
k, ψk)rk=1 which satifies
conditions (i) and (ii) in the definition of cycles. Since Uk ⊂ Ck, one has
ψk ∈ E˚β[C
k] ⊂ E˚β[U
k]. Thus, (Uk, ψk)rk=1 is a cycle in E˚β.
6 Interaction sheaves over convex domains
In the present section, we consider a special case which however turns up in
many applications, namely that where the domain A is a convex and compact
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subset of some Euclidean space Rd. Let C denote the set of all convex and closed
subsets of A and C0(A,N) the set of all interaction arrays ϕ such that ϕ(S) ∈ C
for all S ∈ P0(N). Working with convex domains, it seems natural to restrict
preferences to all R ∈ Q(A) which are convex in the sense that for each a ∈ A,
the set P (a,R) is convex. Denoting this subset of Q(A) by QC(A), we say that an
interaction presheaf is c-stable if Stl(E , RN) 6= ∅ for each RN ∈ QC(A)
N . Adding
a linear structure of the outcome space means that in some cases, the properties
of acyclicity and consequently ofM-solvability may take another form due to the
restriction on the set of admissible preferences.
We then have to revise the results in Section 4 so as to take the convexity
of domain and preferences into consideration. For this, we must modify the
definition of a cycle given in Definition 4.1. We use the notation co(B) for the
convex hull of B ⊂ A.
Definition 6.1 Let E be an interaction sheaf on (N,A), A convex cycle in E is
a family (Uk, ϕk)rk=1 with U
k ∈ G0 and ϕ
k ∈ E [Uk], each k, such that
(i) ∪nk=1U
k = A,
(ii) if i ∈ N and ∅ 6= J ⊂ {1, . . . , r} then there exists k ∈ J such that
Uk ∩ co
(
∪j∈J R
i(ϕj)
)
= ∅.
Lemma 4.2 is still valid in this context provided that its condition (2) is suitably
reformulated.
Lemma 6.2 Let E be an interaction sheaf. Let Z = (W k, ϕk)rk=1 be a family
with W k ∈ G0, ϕ
k ∈ E [W k], k = 1, . . . , r, and ∪nk=1W
k = A. Then the following
are equivalent:
(1) Z is a convex cycle of E,
(2) For each i ∈ N there is a permutation (k1, . . . , kr) of (1, . . . , r) such that
for any j ∈ {1, . . . , r},[
W k1 ∪ · · · ∪W kj
]
∩ co
([
Ri(ϕkj) ∪ · · · ∪Ri(ϕkr)
])
= ∅.
Let C0(A,N) be the set of all interaction arrays that are closed-and-convex valued.
We define EC[U ] = E [U ] ∩ C0(A,N).
Lemma 6.3 E is acyclic if and only if EC is acyclic. E is stable on QC if and
only if EC is stable.
Proof: Clearly any cycle in EC is a cycle in E . Conversely, let (W
k, ϕk)rk=1 be a
cycle in E . If for each k, we replace ϕk by ϕ′k, where ϕ′k(S) = co(ϕk(S)) for all
S ∈ P0(N), we obtain a cycle (W
k, ϕ′k)rk=1 in EC. Therefore E is acyclic if and
only if EC is acyclic. We have a similar argument for stability.
Before proving the counterpart of Theorem 4.4 in the context of convex cycles,
we need the following:
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Lemma 6.4 Let C1 ⊂ · · · ⊂ Cp be an increasing sequence of compact and convex
sets of Rd such that 0 ∈
◦
C1 and Ck ⊂
◦
Ck+1 for k = 1, . . . , p−1. Then there exists
a continuous quasiconvex function v such that
v(x) ≤ k ⇐⇒ x ∈ Ck, k = 1, . . . , p.
Proof: For any convex set containing 0, denote by JC(x) = inf{λ > 0 | x ∈ λC}
(= +∞ if the latter set is empty) and let ∂C denote the boundary of C. Define
v as follows:
v(x) =


JC1(x) if x ∈ C1,
k +
JCk (x)−1
JCk (x)−JCk+1 (x)
if x ∈ Ck+1\Ck (k = 1, · · · , p− 1)
p− 1 + JCp(x) if x ∈ R
d \ Cp
Then v is continuous on any point x ∈ Rd \ ∪pk=1∂Ck since the functions JCk
are continuous and JCk(x) − JCk+1(x) > 0 for x 6= 0. Moreover if x ∈ ∂Ck then
v(x) = k so that one can verify easily the continuity of v at x.
Now we verify quasiconvexity of v: let x, y ∈ Rd, λ ∈ [0, 1], and let z =
(1− λ)x+ λy. Assume v(x) ≤ v(y). We distinguish 3 cases:
Case 1: y ∈ C1. We have x ∈ C1 so that by convexity of JC1 , v(z) ≤
max{v(x), v(y)}.
Case 2: y ∈ Ck+1 \Ck where 1 ≤ k ≤ p− 1. Let α = v(y)− k. If z ∈ Ck then
v(z) ≤ v(y). If z ∈ Ck+1 \ Ck then
(1− α) JCk(z) + αJCk+1(z)
≤ (1− α)[(1− λ)JCk(x) + λJCk(y)] + α[(1− λ)JCk+1(x) + λJCk+1(y)]
= (1− λ)[(1− α)JCk(x) + αJCk+1(x)] + λ[(1− α)JCk(y) + αJCk+1(y)]
≤ (1− λ) + λ = 1.
Here the first inequality follows from convexity of JCk and JCk+1 and the fact that
0 ≤ α ≤ 1. When x ∈ Ck, we have that JCk(x) ≤ 2 and JCk+1(x) ≤ 1, so that
(1 − α)JCk(x) + αJCk+1(x) ≤ 1. When x ∈ Ck+1 \ Ck, then v(x) − k ≤ α, so
that again (1 − α)JCk(x) + αJCk+1(x) ≤ 1. In both cases v(y) − k = α, so that
(1− α)JCk(y) + αJCk+1(y) = 1. This justifies the second inequality. We conclude
that v(z)− k ≤ α or equivalently v(z) ≤ v(y).
Case 3: y ∈ Rd \Cp. If z ∈ Cp then v(z) ≤ p ≤ v(y). If z ∈ R
d \Cp then either
x ∈ Rd\Cp and by convexity of JCp we have v(z) ≤ v(y) or x ∈ Cp then JCp(x) ≤ 1
than again by convexity of JCp we have JCp(z) ≤ max 1, JCp(y) = JCp(y) so that
v(z) ≤ v(y).
Now we have the ingredients for proving a counterpart of Theorem 4.4. Since the
method of proof is the same, once we have established the necessary ingredients
in the form of Lemma 6.2-6.4 above, we omit the details and present only an
outline of the proof.
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Theorem 6.5 Let E be an interaction presheaf. Then E is stable on QC(A) if
and only if E has no convex cycles.
Proof: (Outline) If E is not stable on QC(A), then existence of a convex cycle
can be proved following the reasoning of the general case, with the only addition
that the empty intersections of condition 2(ii) of Lemma 4.2 extend to the convex
hull of the sets Ri(ϕkj) ∪ · · · ∪ Ri(ϕkr)
)
, so that condition 2(ii) of Lemma 6.2 is
satisfied.
Conversely, if a convex cycle exists, then for every player i, let (k1, . . . , kr) the
permutation given in (2) of Lemma 6.2 and let Bij = co
(
Ri(ϕkj)∪ · · · ∪Ri(ϕkr)
)
.
Removing any empty Bik from the list if necessary, we have that B
i
r ⊂ · · · ⊂ B
i
1
is a decreasing family of compact and convex sets. Moreover the sets Bik may
be expanded is such a way that Bir has nonempty interior, B
i
k ⊂
◦
B ik−1 > 0 for
k = 2, . . . , p, and all intersection properties are kept. Then Lemma 6.4 may be
applied to obtain a continuous quasiconvex function vi such that vi(x) ≤ pi+1−k
if and only if x ∈ Bik. The profile (u1, · · · , un), where u
i = −vi(x) (i = 1, · · · , n),
will then have an empty settlement set.
7 Concluding remarks
In the previous sections, we have introduced the concept of an interaction sheaf
and used it for the characterization of solvable game forms. This was done in
a topological framework. Equivalence between acyclicity and stability is proved
for the class of continuous preferences. In fact the Hausdorff assumption on the
compact set A provides a class of continuous preferences rich enough to separate
closed sets by respecting some combinatorial property. The results are thus sim-
ilar to those of the discrete framework (e.g. Abdou and Keiding (2003)). If the
context requires restricted domains of preferences, the notion of acyclicity has to
be modified in accordance to that domain (see Kolpin (1991) for the effectivity
function case). As an interesting framework for this restriction we considered the
case of convex domains and convex continuous preferences.
The interaction sheaf represents conflicts in an intrinsic way, since strategy sets
are not explicitly described. The interpretation of an interaction sheaf adopted
thoughout this paper is of the β-type. The power described is the upsetting power,
the dual of which would be the stabilizing, or forcing power. In consistency with
this interpretation, the interaction sheaf of a game form as presented here contains
exactly the information needed to decide upon the question of solvability, and it
cannot be excluded that future problems may need a further development of the
concepts used, so that we might not yet have reached the final form of describing
the power structure in a game form. However, the interaction sheaf seems to be
suitable for many problems, of which we have only touched upon a few. Also,
22
it should be observed that the construction may be applied not only to strategic
game forms but also to conflict situations which are presented in a less simple
form (indexed families of game forms, generalized game forms), pointing to a
more basic role of the interaction sheaf for analyzing conflict situations. They
may be either very simple, if they reflect the effectivity, where each coalition acts
separately, or more complex, where individuals act jointly (Nash) and even more
complex when all coalitions act jointly (strong Nash). But since all those specific
forms can be extracted by projection from a unique form, the model allows for
comparision of different contextual interactions, and it may be applied to an
investigation of degrees of instability in cases where stability is not achieved. A
closer study of these possibilities will however be a matter of future research.
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